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A B S T R A C T
Wild cod is a scarce and valuable natural resource. However, cod fishing along the coast of northern Norway has
largely been about fishing as much as possible with the least possible resource effort, and thereby at the lowest
cost. This traditional volume logic is rooted in biology, meteorology, and small scale capture technology. The
logic is further enhanced by new large scale capture technology and a raw fish market where quality differences
essentially are not reflected in the price of the fish. The intention of this paper is to address the extent to which
the institutional framework in the Norwegian cod fisheries encourage or moderate this volume logic. In the
paper fishing gear usage and the post-harvest industries’ product mix the last decade are analyzed. The findings
show that the volume logic is still at work although this result in reduced quality of the catch landed, a product
mix dominated by low-end products, and limited socio-economic value creation. This institutionalized volume
logic is highly resistant to change. Moreover, the paper address how a competing and more customer-oriented
quality logic can help create greater export values in Norwegian cod fisheries. Finally, implications are high-
lighted for how institutional measures can moderate the dominant volume logic and strengthen the emerging
quality logic more in line with key policy objectives for Norwegian cod fisheries.
1. Introduction
The main focus of fisheries management has generally been to avoid
overfishing. This has been essential since efficient technology enabled
us to eradicate wild fish stocks [1]. The Northwest Atlantic cod, for
example, has been regarded as heavily overfished throughout its range,
resulting in a crash in the fishery in the United States and Canada
during the early 1990s [2]. In contrast, the catch of Northeast Arctic
cod, while regarded as fully exploited, has been regulated successfully
jointly by Norway and Russia. The total stock has grown since 2006 and
peaked in 2013 [3].
From a general perspective [4], concludes that “Despite improve-
ments in fish processing and distribution practices, loss or wastage between
landing and consumption still accounts for an estimated 27 percent of landed
fish (p. 6).” Accordingly, FAO added reducing quality-based waste
(QBW) as an important object for fishery management. This paper sets
out to address the problem of QBW in the Norwegian cod industry
empirically, and explore its negative impact on value adding to the cod
resource. Thus, the following overall research question is raised: Is the
Norwegian cod industry locked into a value-destructive volume logic?
Institutional theory (e.g. Refs. [5,6] is chosen as the primary theo-
retical lens to understand and explain the phenomenon. The literature
review concludes that QBW is resulting from a mismatch between two
opposing institutional logics; a dominant volume logic and a competing
quality logic. The unbalance gives a premium for those players who
embrace the volume logic, which is a result of several factors depending
on setting and species studied. A case study of the Norwegian cod
fisheries point out the migration pattern of the fish, the institutional
environment, and economics of scale as important drivers of the volume
logic and the resulting QBW problem. To assess the importance of the
volume logic and its development in Norwegian cod fisheries, the study
uses 10-year data on landings and fishing gear usage along with the
industries’ product portfolio.
The harvesting strategy chosen reveal how fishermen adapt to
maximize catch per unit of effort (CPUE) (Dreyer & Hermansen, 2010).
The strategy is chosen within the institutional framework society and
authorities have established for the fisheries. When fishermen chose a
harvesting strategy, it must be within these frames to be legal and le-
gitimate. Accordingly, this study investigates whether one important
driver for QBW in the Norwegian cod fisheries is what type of gear the
fishermen choose to use. Moreover, an important result of QBW in
fisheries is manifested in the product portfolios of the processing firms.
If QBW is significant in a fishery, the product portfolio will be domi-
nated by low-end products. In contrast, if QBW is low, the product
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portfolios are mainly expected to be dominated by high end products.
To illustrate this relationship, this study examines the composition and
development of the product portfolios of the Norwegian cod processing
industry the last decade.
An important institutional strategy in order to add value to a fishery
is to reduce QBW. To add value to the Norwegian cod industry, the
tipping point between the volume and quality logics must be changed.
However, the migration pattern of cod is an important moderator. The
institutional framework, which is politically designed, may on the other
hand enhance a quality logic. Based on this argument, this study
questions whether there is a significant potential for adding value to the
Norwegian cod industry by changing the institutional framework to
reduce QBW.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the theoretical
institutional framework that are applied in an empirical study of the
Norwegian cod industry. Section 3 focuses on the isomorphic drivers
supporting the dominant volume logic, that is the migration pattern of
cod, the institutions embracing the cod industry, and the industry's
emphasis on minimizing catch per unit effort through utilizing tech-
nology that support economics of scale. Section 4 discusses the op-
posing and competing quality logic of the dominant volume logic. Next,
empirical results are presented, and the paper ends with a discussion
and conclusion.
2. Theory
[6] argue that organizations not only compete for resources but also
for political power and institutional legitimacy. In these processes,
there are three forces that pull organizations into isomorphic directions
and force them to become increasingly similar. It is coercive pressure,
normative pressure, and mimetic behavior. Coercive pressure can ori-
ginate from laws, regulations (including markets), accreditations, and
broader cultural expectations. Normative pressure is associated with
professional values that can be created through socialization at work,
formal education, networking, and certification processes. Mimetic
behavior occurs when one “organization consciously models itself after
another that it believes to represent a high level of success and
achievement in the public eye” [7]; s. 649). A mimetic activity refers to
how organizations respond to uncertainties that may be related to their
own goals or requirements from their environment. In both cases, the
requirements may cause an organization to mimic others who they
perceive as more legitimate or successful [6].
The term “institutional logic” was first introduced by Ref. [5] to
describe contradictory practices and convictions built into modern
Western social institutions. A central assumption is that appropriate
behavior within the individual logic is governed by norms that guide
the actions of the actors [8]. Thornton and Ocasio [9]: 804) defines an
institutional logic as “the socially constructed, historical patterns of
material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by which
individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize
time and space, and provide meaning to their social reality.”
A collective identity can be developed among members of a social
group based on their perception of having something in common with
others in the group. The identity consists of the cognitive, normative,
and emotional contract between the actors. When collective identities
become institutionalized, a distinctive institutional logic develop;
“Institutional logics are the organizing principles that shape the beha-
vior of field participants” [10]: 631). A key assumption is that appro-
priate behavior in a given institution complies with norms that pre-
scribe how the institution's actors should act [8].
Over time, institutional logic will be developed and reinforced as a
consequence of formal structures and normative constructions being
reflected in each other. Such logic constitutes an important theoretical
structure because they help to explain what creates a sense of “common
purpose and unity” within an organizational field. Therefore, it is ar-
gued that different organizational fields are characterized by their own
dominant institutional logic even if two or more logics exist simulta-
neously within a given field [9,11]. Different institutional logics can
operate in parallel. Research shows that neither minor nor major
changes in institutional settings lead to “old” logics being replaced by
“new.” Instead, it seems that the logics live side by side, partly as
competitors and partly as complementary [12,52].
In the present study, the concept of institutional logics to the supply
chain of the Norwegian cod industry is applied as it is argued that the
chain is characterized by a dominant volume logic and a competing
quality logic. Fig. 1 illustrates this theoretical argument. It can be ar-
gued that the Norwegian supply chain for cod is dominated by a value-
destructive volume logic. The emphasis of this logic is to supply large
volumes of fish to customers at low prices. However, the volume logic is
challenged by a less strong quality logic that offers customers high
quality fish at higher prices. If the additional price that customers are
willing to pay is greater than the additional costs of improving the
quality, value could be added throughout the supply chain if it was
based on a quality logic. Hence, it can be argued that a supply chain
dominated by a volume logic destructs values (i.e., it creates QBW).
According to the model, the supply chain is locked into a volume logic
by isomorphic drivers. The three main drivers are the migration pattern
of the fish (see Fig. 2), institutions, and economics of scale.
3. Drivers of the volume logic
The model proposed for understanding and analyzing the volume
logic include three major drivers; migration pattern, institutions and
economics of scale. This section explains why these drivers are im-
portant.
3.1. Migration pattern
Historically, cod fishing along the coast of northern Norway has
been an efficiency contest where the main priority has been to bring on
Fig. 1. Isomorphic drivers, institutional logics, and quality-based waste in the Norwegian wild cod fisheries.
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land as large a fish volume as possible with the least catch per unit
effort (CPUE). The majority of the fishing is conducted by coastal ves-
sels with gears like jigging, long-line, gillnet, and Danish seines. The
coastal fleet is allocated quotas partly as a result of historical activity
and as important suppliers due to regional policy considerations
[13,14].1 In the winter (February–April), the fish gather in a limited
area near the coast to spawn [15]. The Hermansen-Dreyer model is
developed to explain the seasonal intensity of the Norwegian cod
fishery [16]. The model includes fixed seasonal variation in CPUE as the
major driver for seasonality. If the CPUE of the most valuable part of
the stock is lowest in a limited area close to the shore in a period where
the risk for missing other important fisheries are low, it is a recipe of
concentration of fishing both in time and space. Accordingly, the har-
vesting strategy is adapted to the cods’ migration pattern. This is an
economically rational strategy especially if the limited mobility of the
coastal fleet is considered. However, this harvest strategy creates lo-
gistical and quality challenges [17]. The catches are purchased by local
processing plants that traditionally have solved the logistic challenges
by distributing huge volume fresh and unprocessed fish to Europe or by
salting or drying the cod. For the largest vessel, the major strategy has
been to freeze the cod unprocessed aboard [18].
The fishing intensity during this period—in both time and
space—makes it challenging to make quality considerations. Each fish
must be bled and stored in a proper way to avoid quality losses.
Processing plants also have to preserve and distribute large volumes
within limited capacity and time [19]. This process is similar to the
value destruction due to the race to fish described by Ref. [20]. Hence,
the focus on CPUE, low cost based on the migration pattern of the cod
and a fleet dominated by small vessels has institutionalized a volume
logic in both harvesting and post-harvesting processing in the cod in-
dustry. Thus, the migration pattern can be interpreted as coercive iso-
morphic force in the Norwegian wild cod fishery.
3.2. Institutions
In this section, it is discussed if institutional conditions may have
reinforced volume logic created by the migration pattern within the
Norwegian cod industry.
3.2.1. Vertical integration
The raw fish market of cod is organized by the fishermen who by
law are given a great deal of supplier power through being able to es-
tablish minimum prices (Fish Sales Act, 1938/2013). Hence, all sales
take place through fishery owned sales companies with monopoly
power in each region [21]. An important reason for this in-
stitutionalized skewed distribution of power between buyers and sellers
is that the fishermen historically have needed protection against oli-
gopolistic buyers as they have been vulnerable to buyer power when
large quantities of fresh and lightly perishable fish have been landed in
a short and hectic season [22,23]. Consequently, the post-harvesting
plants have a weak institutional position in the primary market for fish.
They have a fixed geographic location and they are dependent on
buying fish caught on fishing areas close to their location. They are not
allowed to own and operate fishing vessels (Participant Act, 1999).2
There are no restrictions for establishing new post-harvesting plants
and the establishing costs are low, contributing to slack in capacity in
most part of the year and tough competition in this market [24].
3.2.2. Market failures
In a well-functioning market, one expects that quality differences
will affect the prices of the fish sold [25], and there is evidence that
quality do influence cod prices in the Norwegian cod market [17].
However, sampling based on objective quality measurements reveal
that QBW is considerable in the cod fishing industry in the winter
period [26,27], indicating that the prices do not fully reflect the quality
differences. The price differences are marginal, or even nonexistent
[26,27]. Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that this market is not
well-functioning when it comes to reflect the quality variations re-
vealed when inspected objectively by public third party inspectors
[19,28].
This market failure may be caused by the market being character-
ized as a push rather than a pull market [16,29]. Large volume must be
inspected within a short timeframe and the buyer may not have enough
knowledge about the quality of the fish when a transaction takes place.
Alternative inspections will induce extra transaction costs and threaten
a migration pattern-driven volume logic. A third imperfection of the
market may be that the buyer and seller have different negotiating
power. If one of the parties (the fisher in this case) is given a dominant
position, he can use his power to institutionally implement a market
place that does not reflect quality variations and thus preserve a volume
logic driven by for example the migration pattern of the fish.
3.2.3. Fisheries management
The cod fishery is managed to protect the stock and to contribute to
adding value for the stakeholders, where several regulations’ primary
function is the distribution of fish between stakeholders to support the
Fig. 2. Left chart: Yearly Norwegian cod catch the last 40 years (1977–2016). Chart to the right: Monthly average cod catch (2007–2016). Source: Norwegian
Directorate of Fisheries.
1 [17] show that the use of these gears in themselves lead to value destruc-
tion, as cod landed by trawlers and long-liners obtain a higher price.
2 The Participation Act also prohibits owning a majority share in more than
one vessel, although some exemptions have been given.
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viability of fishery dependent communities. The Participation and Raw
fish acts are examples of such regulations, and the strong preference for
small coastal vessel in the quota distribution system is another such
example. However, these regulations can have the promotion of a vo-
lume logic and inhibit a gentle fishery that can better contribute to
catch quality as an unintended consequence.
If fishermen know that fishing will be stopped shortly, this provides
a strong incentive for a “race to fish” to ensure the highest possible
share of a scarce resource available only for a short period [29–31]. The
short harvesting season limits the fishermen's ability to attend to quality
[32]. The fishermen also have limited incentives to preserve the quality
of the least valuable species when catch regulations allocate a quota
bonus for valuable species (e.g., cod) against the fact that other less
valuable species are also being fished such as tusk, haddock, and saithe
[19].
Since 2004, the management system allowed purchases of quotas
[33,34]. Consequently, there are vessel that has purchased so large
quotas that there is hardly any catch time left within the quota year,
focusing on good capacity utilization for the vessel and low per unit
harvesting cost. Large amounts of gear in the sea and large hauls can be
effective catching strategies to fish large volumes at a low cost with a
boat that has large quotas [31]. However, such harvest strategies result
in sea-dead fish, poor bleeding after capture and longer fishing trips,
contributing to reduced quality of the fish landed. According to the
Hermansen-Dreyer model (2010), a quota portfolio of several species in
itself– i.e. both pelagic and ground fish - might trigger more intense
harvest strategies, to avoid the alternative cost of missing an important
season for other species than cod.
3.2.4. Market induced volume logic
In many countries, the consumption of stock fish (dried fish), salted
fish and salted and dried fish (so-called “cliff-fish”) is historically in-
terwoven in religious rituals relating to the Lent as well as the tradition
of eating fish every Friday. This applies to Spain, Italy, Portugal, Brazil
and Argentina [35]. In other European countries, and especially in the
UK, there has been a significant demand for fresh and frozen cod as this
is the most important ingredient in the popular fish and chips meals
(ibid.).
Among all these customer segments, price has been important.
Norwegian (salted and dried) fish have been relatively cheap, and for
Norwegian exporters it has turned out to be easier to sell fish of poor
quality than pricier, first-class fish. This led to more emphasis being
placed on quantity than quality among the producers [35]. Hence, the
consumption of cod has been dominated by price sensitive consumer
and products that are not so sensitive for raw fish quality.
3.3. Economics of scale
About 1/3 of the Norwegian cod quota is caught by large sea-going
trawlers. When the catch takes place at the high sea, the costs of
transportation increases. In order to reduce fuel consumption and
maximize fishing time, vessels utilize load capacity as best as they can
and reduce the number of fishing trips, for example by freezing the fish
on board [18]. Onboard freezing reduces the potential quality, but at
the same time it provides better quality than if the fish was delivered
freshly after many days at sea (ibid.).
If the cost of delivering good quality is higher than the price gain
achieved in the market, the actors do not have sufficient incentives to
prioritize quality [36]. This can occur when a vessel must reduce catch
efficiency in order to increase delivery quality. For active gear like
Danish seines and trawls, there is a dilemma of large rolls or hauls that
the price gain achieved in good quality may be insufficient to com-
pensate for reduced catch efficiency and increased harvesting cost. Also
for passive gears (fixed), this becomes a dilemma when choosing the
amount and the length of time the gear is in sea. Large hauls (trawl and
seine) and long periods of fishing (long-line and gill nets) impacts
quality negatively. At the same time, it reduces catch costs [16]. In
addition, it is important that the fish is treated carefully onboard to
avoid damages caused by pressure and strikes if one are to preserve
quality [19]. Such challenges are particularly acute when using active
gears such as Danish seine and trawls because large amounts of fish are
then taken on board in each haul.
4. The quality logic
If the quality of the fish is poor before preserving, this deficiency
can never be repaired at later stages in the supply chain [37]. Hence,
poor fish quality is propagated through the supply chain, and poor
quality management at the catching stage has serious repercussions as it
influences which products can be produced and which supply chains
served. A basic prerequisite for a quality logic is that the fishermen and
regulatory authorities have updated knowledge of what constitutes
good fish quality. Although this condition is necessary, it is not suffi-
cient. In order for the knowledge to have a practical impact, it must be
applied. Still, it is not certain that an actor will apply quality knowledge
if there is a lack of economic incentives to ensure good quality of the
fish supplied. Inadequate normative pressure in terms of occupational
pride associated with catch quality can also influence the catch beha-
vior so that good quality is not being prioritized [38].
A quality-focused actor will not leave the gear for a long time in sea,
and will not put the gear in the sea with to high concentration to ensure
full trawls and seines. Moreover, quality conscious fishermen have in-
vested in modern technology to avoid excessive catches and to treat the
fish as gently as possible. On the other hand, quality-focused post-
harvest processors ensures the quality of the catch they receive using
new processing lines that can provide low temperature, good sorting,
gentle processing and fast production [19], and they also provide the
fishermen with incentives to land quality fish.
Norwegian authorities have established quality regulations that set
out the requirements for equipment and behavior onboard the fishing
boat to avoid QBW (in Norwegian: “Forskrift om kvalitet på fisk og
fiskevarer,” 2013). They have established an institutional framework
for the design of processing plants, both on board and on land.
Furthermore, they have established regimes for the closure of fishing
areas which are protected, and they have requirements for the design of
fishing gear to avoid by-catches and large hauls. The authorities have
also gradually developed catch regulations that seek to avoid the race to
fish. The sales organizations and the first-hand market have also un-
dergone major changes to address market failures related to quality
issues. Establishing a dynamic minimum price has helped to curb the
conflict level and improve the balance of power between buyers and
sellers. These have been important adjustments to facilitate better
quality-based pricing in the raw material market [21]. For example,
under the quality regulations, landing of fish that is not bled is illegal.
Additionally, they have intensified their quality inspections.
Fisheries management and technology are key providers to influ-
ence the quality of raw materials. Better quality will increase the re-
putation and hence the social sustainability of wild cod fishing [39]. If
the fishermen are deducted a quota volume to deliver poor quality, this
can act as a strong incentive. It may be naive, however, to believe that
rewards and punishment can solve the quality problem alone. Estab-
lishing professional standards through normative pressure for what is
good and legitimate quality on a scarce and valuable raw material can
help strengthen the quality logic of the supply chain. Probably, the most
important element of a quality logic is that customers are willing to pay
a price premium for good quality. This premium must be large enough
to recapture the additional costs of the players by lifting the quality for
the consumer. If not, the players in the supply chain will lose the eco-
nomic incentives to bring quality fish to the markets.
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5. Empirical analysis
To test the dominant gear usage by fishermen data for all landings of
cod at vessel and gear level from 2007 to 2016 from the Norwegian
Directorate of Fisheries is used. This gives us an opportunity to study in
detail how important drivers of QBW have developed at the catch stage
for the last decade. To investigate the main product forms produced by
post harvesting plants, export data from Statistics Norway for the ten-
year period 2007–2016, as more than 95% of Norwegian cod landings
are exported. The numbers for processed products are converted to live-
weight equivalents using the Directorate of Fisheries conversion table
from product weight to live weight for cod.3
To get a rough indication of the value adding potential of the
Norwegian cod supply chain, the export price per kilo applied cod is
calculated, after having converted it to live weight. The supply of cod is
the scarce factor in the industry, and in this paper the value added is
defined as the export price per live kilo of cod.
Table 1 shows that gears like Gill net, Danish seine and Trawl, all of
which supports a volume logic, accounts for 77–79% of the gear usage
in the Norwegian cod catching industry in the period analyzed. In
contrast, gears like hand- and long-lines which, support a quality logic
only accounts for 21–23% of the gear usage in the Norwegian cod fleet.
This distribution on various types of gear usage has been quite stable
over the past decade. Based on these findings, the Norwegian cod
catching industry appear to still be dominated by a volume logic.
Fig. 3 illustrates how cod was used to create different products
during the last decade. The main product form is cliff-fish (“klippfisk,”
i.e., dried salted cod). The volume has been around 140,000 tons live
weight as of 2010. Since then, the trend has been stable. Frozen whole
cod has been the second largest product form from 2012 and with a
strong positive trend. From a moderate start in 2007 with well 20-
thousand tons, export of whole frozen fish has boomed. It peaked in
2014 when more than 140,000 tons of whole frozen cod was exported.
Fresh whole cod has been the third largest product category since 2013.
In 2014, Norway exported approx. 90 thousand tons of fresh whole cod.
Also for whole fresh cod there is an increasing trend. Since 2014, salted
fish has been the fourth largest applications in volume, and this tradi-
tional product form shows a stable trend. So, does frozen fillet in 5th
place with a volume of approximately 34-thousand tons live weight in
2016. In 6th place stock fish is found. The development has been stable
and at 20,000 tons live weight a year. Fresh fillet is the least exported
product category in Fig. 3. Here too, the volume has been stable and at
just under 20,000 tons per year from 2011. This is particularly inter-
esting when contrasted with the strong position high value fresh fillets
have obtained in the exports of Icelandic cod [40,41].
Fig. 3 discloses that traditional volume oriented applications like
cliff-fish and frozen cod are the leading export articles thus, it does not
seem unreasonable to conclude that the Norwegian cod processing in-
dustry is dominated by a volume logic. While Fig. 3 illustrates how
much of the cod raw material has been applied for different product
categories, Table 2 reports the prices that the various supply chains
obtain per kilogram of live-weigh equivalent cod.
It is apparent from Table 2 that fresh fillets have yielded the highest
export price per kilogram of live cod, with an average of 21.80 in the
period. Next is stock fish, with an average kilo price of 19.61. In third
place, fresh whole fish with is found with an average price of 17.08.
Subsequently, frozen whole fish (14.07 per kilogram), cliff-fish (14.01
per kilo), salted fish (13.94 per kilo) and finally frozen fillet (13.70 per
kilogram of live cod) follow. The development of the prices has been
slightly different for all product categories in Table 2. Apart from stock
fish, prices for the different applications are significantly different from
the highest price category, which was fresh fillet (p< 1%).
The results indicate that the use of fresh fillets creates the highest
values with an average price per kilo live weight of NOK 21.80 in the
10-year period 2007–2016 (see Table 2). However, with an average
output of less than 20,000 tons a year, this product category has the
lowest volume in the period (see Fig. 3). An implication of this finding
is that stakeholders in the supply chain should apply a larger proportion
of their live cod resources to fresh fillets in order to increase value
creation, as has been done at Iceland [42,43].4 However, it is a sig-
nificant problem that the central agents (fillet processing plants) his-
torically have had considerable problems with profitability and survival
(e.g. Ref. [23], related to high production cost.
Stock fish added second highest value with an average price of NOK
19.61 per kilo of live cod in the ten-year period. However, in volume
stock fish was the second least used category with its 20,000 tons a
year. Like fresh fillets, the stock fish volume has been stable during the
period. Export of fresh whole fish yielded the third highest value added
per kilo with NOK 17.08. This is the only one of the three most value
adding products that shows volume growth. Production of fresh whole
fish quadrupled during the period and landed at 80 thousand tons in
2016. This growth can to a certain degree be due to the large-scale
marketing of the brand “Skrei” in recent years [44]. It has been ex-
ported approximately 5-thousand tons “Skrei” a year at an average
price of 36 NOK/kg in the last three years.5
The findings further show that cliff-fish, salted fish, and frozen fish
(whole and fillet) provide the lowest value creation per kilo scare
production factor. Average export price per kilo of live cod is around
NOK 14 for all these product categories. The most significant volumes
go to cliff-fish (about 140,000 tons a year on average) and to frozen
whole fish (about 75,000 tons a year).
6. Discussion and conclusion
The present study address whether the Norwegian cod supply chain
is locked into a value-destructive volume logic. The research question
was theoretically anchored in a tentative model which was derived
from institutional theory (Fig. 1). If the additional cost of landing high
quality fish is lower than the additional earnings resulting from better
priced end products that require high raw material quality, inadequate
quality will hamper value creation in the remaining supply chain [19].
describes this as QBW due to actors being unable to exploit the po-
tential added value of a wild fish. Similar waste takes place if, later, the
additional revenue in the supply chain is not able to cover the addi-
tional cost of the fisherman by delivering high quality on the quayside
(ibid.). If the quality of the fish is poor before preserving, this will never
be repaired [37]. Thus, poor fish quality is propagating throughout the
supply chain of the industry.
Based on the present study, there may be a potential for adding
value in the Norwegian cod supply chain by reducing the high-volume
products' share of the product mix in favor of fresh products (Table 2).
The lost added value in the supply chain by investing in frozen
Table 1
Catch of cod supplied by different gears in Norway at three different times.
Source: Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries.
2007 2012 2016
Gill net 67 374 31% 100 801 28% 94 945 23%
Danish seine 37 443 17% 59 290 17% 93 140 23%
Trawl 63 993 29% 116 956 33% 135 013 33%
Hook 48 769 22% 80 440 23% 89 191 22%
3 Ingrid Kristine Pettersen, Analyst Codfish at the Norwegian Seafood Council,
has provided the raw data for this study.
4 It is of interest to note that in Norwegian salmon aquaculture, where the
control with the production process is even stronger, fresh is the dominant
product form making up more than 85% of the exports [49].
5 Source: The Norwegian Seafood Council.
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products, salted fish, and cliff-fish is an opportunity cost of these ap-
plications. This implies that a portion of the supply chain's potential
added value is used to subsidize products that generate low socio-eco-
nomic values. Since the regulator has limited control of the agents in
the supply chain, it cannot optimize the production as a privately held
company would have done. This is due, among other things, to the fact
that the agents have made major irreversible strategic investments in
boats and post-harvest processing plants based on a historically estab-
lished distribution regimes of raw fish. Against this backdrop, it is un-
derstandable that there is a struggle between the agents to ensure the
greatest possible share of the profits associated with exploiting a
common scarce and valuable wild natural resource.
Cod can be included as an element in different products with dif-
ferent requirements of raw material quality. Highly paid products, such
as fresh fillets, make the strictest demands on raw material quality [19].
Other product variants, such as frozen block products and conventional
products such as salted fish and salted and dried fish, impose somewhat
less requirements on raw material quality (ibid.). Products that require
low raw material quality may in some cases give the firms the highest
contribution margin [45]. However, it is important to note that high
quality raw material, gives the processing plants more options when
choosing which end product to make (ibid.). If the end products are not
sensitive to raw material quality, the willingness to pay a premium
price for high quality will be limited in the first-hand market. If this is
the case, waste because of poor quality is being reinforced by high catch
rates, high costs of ensuring good quality, and production of end pro-
ducts that are not sensitive to raw material quality. This will of course
be strengthened if the suppliers have strong market power and the
buyers have substantial available free production capacity, thus en-
forcing a volume logic throughout the supply chain.
The supply of fresh raw materials is the foremost competitive ad-
vantage of the Norwegian supply chain for cod. Consequently, the
largest possible proportion of the scarce and valuable fish should be
landed and distributed to product options that benefit from the fresh-
ness of the fish and delivered to customers that are willing to pay the
necessary price premium. However, about 1/3 of the cod is frozen at sea
Fig. 3. Application of cod converted to live weight in tons in the period 2007–2016.
Table 2
Export price per kilo applied cod converted to live weight (2007–2016).
Fresh fillet Fresh whole Frozen fillet Frozen whole Salted and dried Salted fish Stockfish
2007 26,56 21,96 16,42 18,21 17,03 17,90 23,19
2008 26,41 21,15 15,68 17,19 16,74 17,67 23,55
2009 20,57 16,49 12,34 10,70 13,37 13,18 18,04
2010 20,70 15,70 10,97 11,85 12,88 11,92 15,24
2011 21,71 16,98 11,94 12,96 14,01 13,53 18,30
2012 18,94 15,30 12,88 11,50 12,50 12,46 19,73
2013 17,10 12,31 11,36 10,24 10,25 9,63 16,03
2014 18,79 13,21 11,85 12,32 11,66 11,12 15,06
2015 22,59 17,82 15,15 17,25 15,34 15,22 22,52
2016 24,60 19,85 18,43 18,52 16,34 16,72 24,45
Mena 21,80 17,08 13,70 14,07 14,01 13,94 19,61
SD 3,24 3,19 2,53 3,31 2,30 2,84 3,61
Sign.a *** *** *** *** *** *** –
a Two sided t-test assuming equal variance. ***p<1%.
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(Table 1). Most of this volume is exported to central cold stores where
domestic adding of value only amounts to a few cents per kilo [46]. The
cod then ends up as raw material for so-called “commodities” (i.e., as
low-end products in shop shelves).6 These cheap products can help push
down the price of high end products that are manufactured in Norway.
In sum, this reduces the export value of the Norwegian cod stock, and it
removes the basis for Norwegian industrial sites in rural areas and the
socio-economic spillover effects that follow from this activity.
Accordingly, a key question is why the authorities allocate quotas to
the players who have a catch pattern that demotes quality and the
lowest value creation potential throughout the supply chain (Tables 1
and 2; [36]. The volume logic is hardly in line with the intentions of the
Marine Resources Act (2008) since it leads to QBW in the Norwegian
cod industry. Apparently, it is a paradox that fishing boat owners and
their crew are making super profit and super wages even though they to
a great extent are producing low quality and low priced products based
on a volume logic. Frozen fish has given the trawlers extraordinary
profitability over time, despite the fact that such production contributes
modestly to the socio-economic value adding in the post-harvest part of
the supply chain.
[46] sees some signs that fishing gear that provides good raw ma-
terial quality is replaced by gear that provide poorer quality in some
fisheries. An example of this is when line fishermen switch to gillnets or
Danish seine. But the loss of quality a fisherman experience can easily
be compensated economically by increasing the volume when the catch
cost is low. Increased knowledge about drivers for financial perfor-
mance among vessels is important to prevent unfortunate design of
catch regulations to help boost the economic incentives for reducing
QBW [16].
Some of the coercive isomorphic drivers discussed are completely
beyond human control in the wild cod industry. This applies, for ex-
ample, to migration pattern and meteorology. Accordingly, the business
activity must adapt to such factors. However, live catching and seasonal
campaigns like the “Skrei”-campaign may help increase the demand
and price for cod temporarily during the year [44].
An important policy implication of this study is to promote a policy
that distributes quotas to fishermen based on the opportunities of the
later stages in the supply chain to jointly create export values of the
precious raw material. This implies less freezing on board (trawling
must be gradually stepped down), smaller quotas for Danish seine and
gill nets, and larger quotas for long-lines and hand lines.
The model proposed in this paper has proven to be promising in
explaining QBW. However, there are some methodological and em-
pirical shortcomings in the study. The external validity should be
challenged in other empirical settings. For example, an obvious study
would be to test the model in an empirical setting with the same species
but another institutional framework than the Norwegian. Promising
candidates would be Iceland and the Faro islands. This will be needed
to further understand how institutional frameworks impact QBW.
Another approach to test external validity is to compare QBW in
different fisheries within the same institutional framework. An inter-
esting observation is that the QBW problem is not as challenging in the
Norwegian pelagic sector as in the cod industry. Purse seines dominate
the pelagic fisheries, but are banned in the cod fisheries. When it comes
to QBW and efficiency, the purse seins perform well. Thus, a compar-
ison of the two sectors within the same institutional framework would
be important to reveal the importance of biology and technology when
addressing the QBW problem.
The internal validity of the model should also be addressed in fur-
ther research. Vertical integration of the harvest and post-harvest op-
eration is a promising path for reducing QBW. However, some com-
panies in the Norwegian cod fisheries have been vertical integrated in
the period studied. These companies have proven to perform poorly
both financially and in producing high-end products [47]. This ob-
servation indicates that QBW problem is not only related to external
factors, like biology, technology and institutional framework, but also
how well firms exploit their internal firm resources [48].
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